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Faculty and Deans

FOURTH AMENDMENT
FINALITY
by John R. Pagan

For a variety of reasons, many people prefer to litigate Issues arising
under the United States Constitution In
federal rather than state court. 1 When
the state prosecutes someone, he seldom has access to a federal forum In
the first Instance. He must raise his
constitutional claim In state court Initially and then, If the state trial and appellate tribunals rule against him, try to
relltlgate the question in U.S. district
court through a habeas corpus action
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or a
civil rights suit filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Due to the size of Its
caseload and other Institutional constraints, the U.S. Supreme Court can
review relatively few state convictions.
Consequently, any diminution of the
district courts' power to use §§ 2254
and 1983 as vehicles for re-examining
Issues previously adjudicated by state
courts Increases commensurately the
extent to which state judges have the
final say on matters of constitutional
Interpretation and application.

Barriers to Relltlgatlon
Culminating a process begun In
Stone v. Powell,• the Supreme Court
In Allen v. McCurry' virtually eliminated the district courts ~uthorlty to redetermine questions Involving defendants' rights under the Fourth Amendment (as applied to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment). The Court In
Allen reversed a decision of the Eighth
Circuit- holding that a state court's denial of a suppression motion should not
be accorded collateral estoppel effect
In a subsequent § 1983 action In federal court. McCurry was convicted of
possession of heroin and assault with
Intent to kill after a Missouri judge admitted Into evidence contraband
seized during an allegedly Illegal
search. Stone barred McCurry from re168/Arkansas Lawyer/October 1981

litigating the Fourth Amendment question on habeas corpus, so he tried
another route Into the federal forum: he
filed a million-dollar damage suit
against the policemen who searched
him. The Court of Appeals permitted
the action to go forward unencumbered
by prior state-court rulings, reasoning
that, given Stone, "If collateral estoppel is to apply In § 1983 actions raising
search and seizure claims, there will be
no federal forum for the victim of a
search and seizure which allegedly violates the federal constitution."• Totally
foreclosing access to a district court
would be Intolerable, the Eighth Circuit
declared, "because of the special role
of federal courts In protecting civil
rlghts." 11
The Supreme Court squarely rejected the Eighth Circuit's view that
every person asserting a federal right Is
entitled to at least one opportunity to
litigate In a district court. Construing §
1983's legislative history, the Court
concluded that when Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 , It meant to
expand the federal courts' jurisdiction
and remedial powers, not reduce state
courts' authority to make binding interpretations of the U.S. Constitution, a
right they have enjoyed since the
founding of the Republic. 7 The Framers
Intended state courts to be, as Henry
Hart put It, "the primary guarantors of
constitutional rights."• Allen Implicitly
acknowledges that state courts can fulfill that responsibility effectively only If
their judgments are granted a high de·
gree of finality. Clearly the Court Is
convinced that state judges possess
the ability and willingness to perform
the tasks assigned them by the Framers, witness Allen's citation' to the following passage In Stone:
[W]e are unwilling to assume that
there now exists a general lack of
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appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights In the trial and appellate
courts of the several States. State
courts, like federal courts, have a
to
constitutional
obligation
safeguard personal liberties and to
uphold federal law... Moreover, the
argument that federal judges are
more expert In applying federal
constitutional law Is especially
unpersuaslve In the context of
search-and-seizure claims, since
they are dealt with on a dally basis
by trial level judges In both systems.
In sum, there Is "no Intrinsic reason
why the fact that a man Is a federal
judge should make him more competent, or conscientious, or learned
with respect to the [consideration of

Fourth Amendment claims] than his
neighbor In the state courthouse." 10
Whatever may have been true in the
past, presumptively parity now exists
between state and federal courts, and
Allen requires the latter to give preclusive effect to the former's Fourth
Amendment decisions. Identical tests
govern both modes of collateral review.
A state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the
ground that evidence obtained In an
unconstitutional search or seizure was
introduced at his trial unless the state
fails to provide him with "an opportunity
for full and fair litigation" of his Fourth
Amendment clalm. 11 In the § 1983 context, collateral estoppel prohibits relltlgatlon except "where the party against
whom an earlier court decision Is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or Issue decided by the first court." 12

Preclusion-Avoidance Devices
We must now consider the ways In
which an artful advocate might be able
to circumvent th~ barriers erected by
Stone and Allen. If the state never actually presses charges against the
search victim, he can sue for damages
under § 1983 In either federal or state 13
court without worrying about preclusion. But If the prosecution commences or appears Imminent, he has
only a few exceedingly problematical
alternatives. Right away he can rule out
a damage suit In federal court because
by the time the litigation reaches the
judgment stage, a state judge probably
will have long since denied his suppression motion, triggering collateral
estoppel. Instead the victim must seek
a speedier form of relief, namely an
Injunction or a declaratory judgment.
Can he procure federal preemption of
the Fourth Amendment Issue by filing
suit In U.S. district court before a state
judge rules on the search's legality? In
most situations the answer surely will
be no. Although federal courts undoubtedly possess the power to Interfere
with constitutionally defective state
prosecutions, the judicially created
doctrine known as "Our Federalism"
severely limits their ability to exercise
that power.
If the state prosecution Is already
under way when the search victim files
his federal complaint, he will find It almost impossible to get the district judge
to hear his Fourth Amendment claim.
Unless he can prove bad faith or other
extraordinary circumstances, Younger v. Harrls14 will proscribe issuance of

an injunction, Samuels v. Mackall 11
will thwart declaratory relief, and Perez
v. Ledesma 11 will prohibit a suppression order. If state criminal proceedings are threatened but have not
yet begun, the victim can seek a federal
declaratory judgment under Steffel v.
Thompson. 17 A district-court ruling
that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment would have preclusive effect In a subsequent state prosecution.
However, Hicks v. Miranda allows
state officials to block Steffel relief by
merely Instituting charges "before any
proceedings of substance on the
merits have taken place In the federal
court." 18 The only way to prevent them
from trumping the federal suit between
the filing of the complaint and trial on
the merits Is to persuade the U.S. district court to grant preliminary Injunctive
relief, a maneuver approved In Doran
v. Salem Inn." To qualify for Etuch relief, the plaintiff must make a sofflclent
showing both of Irreparable harm pendente lite and of likelihood of ultimate
success on the merits. Where the challenged search has already occurred,
the Irreparable-harm requirement will
doubtless prove extremely difficult to
satisfy. At least In theory the opportunIty to raise the Fourth Amendment
Issue as a defense to the state prosecution affords the victim a wholly
adequate remedy. Perhaps a person
who Is engaged In a continuing course
of conduct could qualify for preliminary
federal relief by arguing that unless the
district court halts the state prosecution
and passes judgment on the search's
validity, he will be forced to either surrender his freedom of action or run the
risk of multiple prosecutions. The argument might succeed If the search
Implicated First Amendment values,
but the federal judge could choose
simply to restrain future searches while
the question of the completed conduct's constlt~;~tlonallty Is litigated In
state court. 20 That result would, of
course, leave Allen's force largely undiminished.
Where state-court proceedings are
not yet pending, there exists another
tactic the search victim might employ to
bring his Fourth Amendment claim Into
federal court for trial de novo: Pullman
abstention with an England reservation. This gambit's prospects for success are virtually nil, for It requires the
prosecutors' active, albeit unwitting,
cooperation. Nevertheless, it provides
some Intellectual interest and therefore
merits our attention. The gambit presupposes this scenario: (1) for some

reason the prosecutors are not yet In a
position to press formal charges (e.g.
they need to Investigate further), so
they cannot take advantage of the
Hicks v. Miranda 'trump' 21 ; (2) the victim's federal complaint alleges a violation of state regulations as well as the
Fourth Amendment; (3) the regulations' meaning Is uncertain; and (4) an
Interpretation in the victim's favor
would result In suppression of the evidence, mooting the federal constitutional question. This situation might
tempt prosecutors to try to shunt the
controversy Into state court through
Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman 22 abstention, thereby forestalling federal review of state or local
policemen's Investigatory methods
and buying themselves some extra
time. But If the prosecutors succeed,
theirs will have been a Pyrrhic victory,
at least from the standpoint of Allen
Issue preclusion. The reason Is slmplri.
Pursuant to England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners,"
the search victim could expressly reserve the right to return to federal court
for decision of the Fourth Amendment
question If the state-law Issue were resolved against him. In that event, any
purported decision of federal law by the
state court would not be given collateral estoppel effect In a subsequent
federal action. This Is a rather exotic
end-run around Allen, to be sure, but
footnote 1724 of that opinion hints that It
just might work.

Conclusion
Notwithstanding the preclusionavoidance devices canvassed above,
the combined effect of Allen v.
McCurry, Stone v. Powell, and the
Younger v. Harris line of cases Is to
unify and streamline Fourth Amendment adjudication. Persons accused of
violating state law are now entitled to
no more than one full and fair hearing
on search and seizure questions, subject only to review by higher state tribunals and, ultimately, the Supreme
Court. The U.S. district court serves a
procedural backstop function, Its role
limited to ensuring that the defendant
received an adequate opportunity to
litigate In state court.
I, for one, applaud these developments and would like to see the finality
principle fully implemented in areas
besides the Fourth Amendment.Z 5 Redundancy wastes scarce judicial resources and creates intergovernmental friction while yielding few, If any,
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benefits. The best way to minimize
constitutional error is not for federal
judges to second-guess their state
counterparts, but rather for states to
take the initiative and Improve trial and
appellate procedures so their courts
can become more hospitable fora for
adjudicating federal rights. Let us hope
that Allen's reaffirmation and reinforcement of the state judiciaries' vital
role in the federal system will spur
further reform.
NOTES
• Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe

170/Arkansas Lawyer/October 1981

School of Law, College of William and Mary.
A.B., College of William and Mary; M.Litt., Ox·
ford University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
Member, Arkansas Bar.
'See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1105 (1977).
1
428 u.s. 465 (1976).
•101 S.Ct. 411 (1980).
•McCurry v. Allen,606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979).
"ld. at 798.
"ld. at 799.
'101 S.Ct. at 417·18.
•Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
In Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401
(1953).
"101 S.Ct. at 420.
'"426 U.S. at 493·94, n.35 (citations omitted).
"ld. at 494.
"Allen v. McCurry, 101 S.Ct. at 418.
••seeMainev. Thiboutot, 100S.Ct.2502(1980).
4
' 401 u.s. 37 (1971).
11
401 u.s. 66 (1971).
'"401 u.s. 62 (1971).

415 u.s. 452 (1974) .
422 u.s. 332, 349 (1975) .
11
422 u.s. 922 (1975).
••see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO &H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER THE FED·
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
276·79 (2d ed. Supp. 1981).
••see text accompany note 18 supra.
12
312 u.s. 496 (1941).
13
375 u.s. 411 (1964).
••101 S.Ct. at 418·19, n. 17.
11
The reasoning employed In Allen suggests that
collateral estoppel is not limited to search and
seizure issues. However, thus far the Supreme
Court has not extended Stone's ban on habeas
corpus relitigation beyond the confines of the
Fourth Amendment. See Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979) (due process-based chal·
lenge to sufficiency of evidence held relltigable
on habeas corpus); and Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545 (1979) (equal protection-based racial
discrimination claim held relltigable on habeas
corpus)."'
11
11

